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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Russell Passons contends the district court erred in denying his motion to correct
an illegal sentence under I.C.R. 35(a).

Specifically, he contends his sentence for

aggravated assault was unlawfully enhanced because the plain language of the
weapons enhancement statute does not authorize a longer sentence in his case. As a
result, his sentence exceeds the term authorized for the underlying offense.
Without acknowledging the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court has already
rejected the same arguments in similar cases, the State contends that several
procedural bars should prevent Mr. Passons from raising this argument. The State’s
arguments on the merits are similarly flawed. Therefore, this Court should reject the
State’s arguments, reverse the order denying Mr. Passons’ I.C.R. 35(a) motion, and
remand this case for imposition of a lawful sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Passons’ Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Passons’ motion to correct his illegal
sentence.

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Passons’ Motion To Correct His Illegal
Sentence

A.

The Idaho Supreme Court Has Already Rejected The State’s Argument That
Claims Like Mr. Passons’ Are Not Properly Brought Under I.C.R. 35(a)
Mr. Passons has argued his sentence is illegal under I.C.R. 35(a) because a

sentencing enhancement was improperly applied in his case. The State contends the
courts have no jurisdiction to consider Mr. Passons’ claim under that rule without
acknowledging that the Idaho Supreme Court has already rejected that same argument
in a factually-indistinguishable case. See State v. Kerrigan, 143 Idaho 185, 186-87
(2006) (hereinafter, Kerrigan II). As such, the State’s argument in this case is meritless.
In Kerrigan II, the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery, and his
sentence was enhanced for two reasons – he had battered a law enforcement officer
and he had used a firearm to do so. Kerrigan II, 143 Idaho at 186-87. He filed a direct
appeal, which the Court of Appeals described as “primarily a sentence review.” State v.
Kerrigan, 123 Idaho 508, 509 (Ct. App. 1993) (hereinafter, Kerrigan I); see Kerrigan II,
143 Idaho at 186 n.2 (acknowledging the prior appeal). Ten years later, the defendant
filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under I.C.R. 35(a), alleging the application
of both enhancements was improper, and that meant his sentence was illegal. Kerrigan
II, 143 Idaho at 187.
On appeal, as it has in Mr. Passons’ case (Resp. Br., p.4), the State argued that
the defendant’s motion in Kerrigan II “is in essence an attack on his conviction, not his
sentence,” and so, asserted that argument was “untimely and the district court was
without jurisdiction to consider it.” Kerrigan II, 143 Idaho at 187. The Idaho Supreme
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Court expressly rejected that argument: “The fact that Kerrigan challenges the legality
of his sentence is not, as the State suggests, tantamount to an attack on his underlying
conviction.” Id. Mr. Passons’ argument actually illustrates the Supreme Court’s point.
His argument is that the enhancement was not properly applied to his case, which
means he should have been sentenced in accordance with the general aggravated
assault statute (I.C. § 18-906). Since his sentence exceeds the term authorized by the
general aggravated assault statute, his sentence, as opposed to underlying conviction
for aggravated assault, is illegal if the enhancement is not properly applied to his case.
Because such challenges are addressing the legality of the sentence, and
because I.C.R. 35(a) authorizes the district court to correct an illegal sentence at any
time, the Idaho Supreme Court held, “the district court possessed the necessary
jurisdictional power to consider Kerrigan’s motion.”

Id.

The Supreme Court has

subsequently reaffirmed that such claims are properly made under I.C.R. 35(a). See
State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86 (2009). This is because, to resolve the merits of
such motions, “neither [the Supreme Court] nor the district court review[] anything
beyond the basic public records concerning the conviction and sentence, and the
statutory language of the enhancements. In other words, in Kerrigan [II] neither court
was required to reexamine the underlying facts surrounding the assault and battery to
determine whether the defendant’s sentence was illegal.” Id.
As Mr. Passons’ motion asks the courts to perform the same analysis the
Supreme Court expressly allowed for in Kerrigan II and Clements – to review the basic
public records concerning his sentence and the statutory language of the relevant
enhancement in order to determine whether his sentence is illegal – the State’s
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characterization of Mr. Passons’ argument as a challenge to his conviction is, just as it
was in Kerrigan II, improper. The courts have jurisdiction to consider the merits of
Mr. Passons’ claim under I.C.R. 35(a).

B.

Given The State’s Acknowledgment That Mr. Passons Has Not Raised This
Argument Before, Res Judicata Does Not Bar Him From Doing So Now
Although the State asserts Mr. Passons’ argument in this case should be barred

by the doctrine of res judicata, it does not identify which type of res judicata it is arguing
for.

(See Resp. Br., p.5.)

That is important because the party which invokes the

doctrine of res judicata “must prove all the essential elements” of that doctrine before it
will take effect in a given case. Waller v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 146 Idaho
234, 237 (2008). The two forms of res judicata – issue preclusion and claim preclusion
– each have different elements. See Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123-24
(2007). Because the State has not identified which form of res judicata it is arguing for,
it has failed to show that it has actually met its burden to prove all the essential
elements of its claim. Therefore, its argument for application of res judicata should be
rejected. Cf. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013) (holding that, where the
State did not properly raise the issue of harmless error (an issue on which the State
bore the burden of proof on appeal), the Court would not consider that argument on
appeal).
At any rate, an evaluation of the facts of this case shows the State has actually
failed to meet its burden. This is evident from the State’s admission that Mr. Passons
has not previously raised this argument to the district court. (See Resp. Br., p.5 arguing
res judicata should apply “even if [Mr.] Passons’ current argument in relation to that
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issue was not” raised to the Court of Appeals previously).) The State’s argument is
erroneous because that fact is actually fatal to claim for res judicata in both its forms.1
First, as to issue preclusion, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained that, if an
argument has not been previously raised to the district court, issue preclusion does not
apply. Ticor Title, 144 Idaho at 123-24 (“The issue of whether Stanion was unjustly
enriched . . . [was] not actually litigated nor decided by the bankruptcy court. Thus, we
hold Ticor’s claim is not barred by issue preclusion.”) The Supreme Court reaffirmed
that rule in Severson v. State, 159 Idaho 517, 522 (2015). In that case, the district court
decided that, because the defendant failed to raise his claim regarding some, but not
other, statements of alleged prosecutorial misconduct in his direct appeal, he could not
raise an argument in regard to the theretofore-unchallenged statements in a subsequent
proceeding. Id. at 519-20. Although it questioned why the defendant had not raised all
his potential claims relating to all the allegedly-improper statements on direct appeal, it
still rejected the district court’s application of issue preclusion: “Because Severson did
not raise these statements on his direct appeal and the majority, therefore, did not
address them, they were not actually decided in the prior litigation. Because they were
not actually decided in the prior litigation, issue preclusion cannot apply to them.” Id. at
522.

1

Here, again, it is important to note the State’s argument is premised on the inaccurate
idea that Mr. Passons is attacking the underlying conviction rather than the legality of
his sentence. (See Resp. Br., p.5.) As discussed in Section A, supra, that is not the
case. That means, even if the State’s entire argument – that a challenge to the
lawfulness of the conviction in the direct appeal might be enough to trigger res judicata
generally (which, for the reasons which will be discussed infra, Mr. Passons does not
concede) – it is still insufficient to trigger res judicata in this case because Mr. Passons
is not renewing a previously-denied challenge to his conviction in this motion. Rather,
he is making a new challenge to the legality of his sentence.
6

Mr. Passons did not raise the issue of an illegal sentence in his prior direct
appeal. See State v. Passons, 158 Idaho 286 (Ct. App. 2015) (addressing Mr. Passons
challenges to the admission of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) and the denial of his
motion for mistrial). Nor has he filed any other motions under I.C.R. 35 besides the one
now at issue.2 (See generally R., Supp. R; see also R., pp.2-9 (the register of actions
showing only the one I.C.R. 35 motion filed in this case).) Therefore, as in Severson
and Ticor Title, the fact that this argument has not been litigated or decided previously
means it will not be barred under issue preclusion.
That fact is also fatal to an argument under the claim preclusion form of res
judicata. One aspect of claim preclusion is that it bars litigation of claims in a second
cause of action which could have been, but which were not, litigated in the first cause of
action.

Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94 (2002).

The State suggests that

Mr. Passons could have challenged the legality of his sentence in the direct appeal, and
so, since he did not, he should be barred from doing so under I.C.R. 35(a). (Resp. Br.,
p.5.) However, the premise of that argument – that Mr. Passons could raise the claim of
illegal sentence for the first time in the direct appeal – has also already been expressly
rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court: “We will not address on appeal a challenge to
the legality of a sentence where the trial court was not given an opportunity to consider
the issue.” State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 578-79 (1991). Rather, “[t]he State or a

2

Certainly, if an issue was actually raised in a previous I.C.R. 35 motion, the doctrine of
issue preclusion would prevent the defendant from re-raising that same issue in a
second I.C.R. 35 motion. State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 63 (2015); State v. Rhoades,
134 Idaho 862, 863 (2000). However, as Mr. Passons has not filed any other I.C.R. 35
motions, those decisions are inapplicable to his case.
7

defendant may challenge the legality of the sentence in the trial court under I.C.R. 35
and appeal from the trial court’s ruling if necessary.” Id.
Mr. Passons did as the Idaho Supreme Court instructed in Martin and raised his
challenge to the illegal sentence to the district court in an I.C.R. 35(a) motion rather than
raising for the first time on direct appeal. Because he could not have raised that claim
in the prior direct appeal, the State’s admission that Mr. Passons has not previously
made this claim in the district court means claim preclusion also does not apply to this
case.
Since the State has failed to prove the essential elements of both forms of res
judicata, this Court should consider the merits of Mr. Passons’ argument.

C.

Under The Plain Language Of I.C. § 19-2520, Mr. Passons’ Sentence Was
Improperly Enhanced, Which Means It Is Illegal On The Face Of The Record
Although I.C. § 19-2520 generally provides that a sentence may be enhanced if

the defendant uses a “firearm or other deadly weapon” in the commission of a crime, it
addresses the scenario where the use of the weapon is also an element of the
underlying crime in a separate part of the statute. I.C. § 19-2520. In that specific
scenario, the statute only provides: “This section shall apply even in those cases where
the use of a firearm is an element of the offense.” Id. Mr. Passons contends that, by
discussing only firearms in that part of the statute, particularly when the term “or other
deadly weapon” is used elsewhere in the statute, the plain language of the statute
reveals that, if the use of a weapon is an element of the offense, an enhancement for
use of that weapon is only authorized when that weapon is a firearm. (See generally
App. Br.) Since the knife he allegedly used in this case is not a firearm, and use of the
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knife is an element of the charged offense, the enhancement is not properly applied in
Mr. Passons’ case. That means the application of the enhancement to extend the term
of his sentence beyond that authorized in the general aggravated assault punishment
statute (I.C. § 18-906) constitutes impermissible cumulative punishments in violation of
the protection against double jeopardy.
The State’s first response is that, since Idaho’s sentencing enhancement scheme
generally is meant to provide only one sentence, there can be no double jeopardy
violation in this case. (Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) The State’s argument is mistaken because it
fails to appreciate the United States Supreme Court’s explanation of why such a
sentencing scheme does not violate the protection against double jeopardy.
The United States Supreme Court’s analysis begins with the presumption that
the Legislature does not intend to address punishment for a single offense in two
different statutes. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980). As such, the
general rule is that, when a single offense is punished under two statutes, that violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 691-92.
While I.C. § 19-2520 does not create a new crime, it does authorize additional
punishment for a single offense in a second statute. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 103
Idaho 135, 137 (1982); State v. Galaviz, 104 Idaho 328, 330-31 (Ct. App. 1983). That is
actually evident in Mr. Passons’ case, where the use of the knife, which is the basis for
the enhancement, is also charged as the means or method by which the crime of
aggravated assault was committed.

(Supp. R., p.55 (alleging Mr. Passons “did

intentionally, unlawfully and with apparent ability threaten by word or act to do violence
upon the person of [V.K.] with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife”).) Therefore, both the
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enhancement and the underlying offense are punishing “the same offense.” See, e.g.,
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (holding two statutes proscribe
the “same offense” unless each requires proof of an element the other does not);
State v. Sepulveda, 161 Idaho 79, ___, 383 P.3d 1249, 1257 (2016) (explaining that,
where one offense is alleged as a means or element of the commission of another
offense, it is an included offense for double jeopardy purposes under Idaho’s pleading
theory). As a result, if it were just the Whalen presumption at issue, Mr. Passons’
sentence would be impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 69192.
However, the United States Supreme Court went on to explain that the
Legislature could avoid the Whalen presumption if it makes it clear that such an
enhancement it is intended to authorize a single, longer potential sentence. Id.;
accord Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366-67 (1983).

Essentially, what the

Legislature can do is make it clear that it is effectively replacing the sentence authorized
under the general punishment statute with a different sentence authorized under the
enhancement based on the existence of some additional element.3 See id. In that
case, there is no double jeopardy issue because there is only one punishment imposed
under the enhancement statute. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368.
This is, in fact, how Idaho’s enhancement sentencing scheme generally
operates. See, e.g., State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 919-20 (Ct. App. 1996); Galaviz,
104 Idaho at 330-31.

However, that sentencing enhancement scheme is only

3

Because this is effectively what is happening, the requirement that the State to prove
the element justifying the enhancement to a jury becomes self-evident. See Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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acceptable because the legislative intent to authorize the enhanced punishment in the
given circumstance is clear from the statutory language. For example:
The Idaho legislature has chosen to fix different penalties for the
crime of robbery—a lesser penalty where the crime is committed without
the use of a deadly weapon, and a greater one where a deadly weapon is
involved. The legislature has adopted two statutes rather than one to
accomplish this result.
The Idaho legislature has clearly intended to authorize the courts,
under I.C. § 19-2520, to impose additional punishment for robbery where
the crime is accomplished with use of a firearm.
Galaviz, 104 Idaho at 330-31; see also Ayala, 129 Idaho at 920 (“Unlike the statute at
issue in United States v. Freyre-Lazaro, 3 F.3d 1496 (11th Cir. 1993), which is cited by
Ayala, the intent of the Idaho legislature in enacting I.C. § 37-2739B clearly was to
provide for an enhanced minimum term of confinement as a penalty upon the
commission of drug offenses within 1000 feet of schools.”)
Idaho’s weapon enhancement statute has clear language which addresses the
situation where use of the weapon is also an element of the underlying offense: “This
section shall apply even in those cases where the use of a firearm is an element of the
offense.” I.C. § 19-2520; see Galaviz, 104 Idaho at 331. However, that language
clearly speaks only in terms of “firearms”; there is no language stating that authorization
also exists in situations where the weapon is an “other deadly weapon.” I.C. § 19-2520.
In fact, although the Legislature used the “or other deadly weapon” language elsewhere
in the statute, it specifically did not use that language in the section relevant to
Mr. Passons’ case. See id. As Hunter itself made clear, the exception to the general
rule from Whalen is qualified: such enhancements are “‘not permitted unless elsewhere
specifically authorized by Congress.’” Hunter, 459 U.S. at 367 (quoting Whalen, 445
U.S. at 693) (emphasis from Hunter). Since there is no specific authorization for the
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enhancement when use of an “other deadly weapon” is an element of the underlying
offense, the Hunter exception does not apply. See id. That leaves this case under the
general rule from Whalen.

As such, the sentence in Mr. Passons’ case was only

authorized by I.C. § 18-906, which allows for a maximum term of five years. Thus, the
term of Mr. Passons’ sentence beyond that, which was improperly imposed pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2520, amounts to an improper cumulative sentence under a second statute,
which, despite the general design of Idaho’s sentence enhancement scheme, still
violates the protection against double jeopardy.
The State’s second argument on the merits asserts that, because aggravated
assault can be committed in multiple ways, the use of the deadly weapon allegation is
what makes Mr. Passons guilty of “aggravated assault with the enhancement,” as
opposed to just aggravated assault. (See Resp. Br., p.8.) However, that argument fails
to account for the statutorily-defined elements of aggravated assault and the
prosecutor’s charging decisions in that regard, both of which reveal the State’s
argument in this regard is meritless.
To allege “aggravated assault,” the prosecutor has to allege an assault was
committed (a) with a deadly weapon; (b) with force likely to cause great bodily harm; or
(c) with corrosive acid or other caustic chemical.4 I.C. § 18-905(a)-(c). The prosecutor
specifically chose to charge Mr. Passons under I.C. § 18-905(a).

(Supp. R., p.55

(alleging Mr. Passons “did intentionally, unlawfully and with apparent ability threaten by
word or act to do violence upon the person of [V.K.] with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a

4

In its argument on appeal, the State does not identify which alternate theory it believes
Mr. Passons could have been charged under. (See generally Resp. Br., p.8.)
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knife”) (emphasis added).) A prosecutor has discretion in deciding how to charge a
defendant, and that includes choosing whether to allege alternative means of
committing the charged offense. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 709 (2009). “[T]he
state is bound by such a choice.” State v. Miguel Hernandez, 136 Idaho 8, 12 (Ct. App.
2001).5
In Miguel Hernandez, the prosecutor chose to charge the defendant under
I.C. § 37-2732(f), and not I.C. § 37-2732B(b), even though he could have charged the
defendant under section -2732B(b) as an alternative. Miguel Hernandez, 136 Idaho at
11-12. As a result of the prosecutor’s charging decision, the Court of Appeals held the
subsequent imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence authorized only under section
-2732B(b), was improper, as it was not authorized by the statute under which the
defendant had actually been charged. Id. at 12. Similarly here, although the prosecutor
might have alleged an alternative means of committing aggravated assault, he did not.
(Supp. R., p.55.) The State is bound by his choice to charge the use of the knife as an
element of the underlying offense. That means the State’s argument on appeal – that
sentence should be deemed legal because Mr. Passons could potentially have been
charged under an alternative theory, and, in that case, use of the knife would only be
relevant to the enhancement – is meritless.
Finally, the State contends that State v. Mario Hernandez, 120 Idaho 653
(Ct. App. 1991) – in which the Court of Appeals held, without explanation, that I.C. § 192520’s language authorizing the enhancement when use of a firearm was an element of

5

There are two cases referenced in this brief entitled “State v. Hernandez.” To avoid
confusion, citations thereto will include the defendant’s first name.
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the underlying offense also applied to use of a weapon other than a firearm – was
properly decided. (Resp. Br., p.8; see App. Br., pp.8 (arguing this Court should reject
the conclusion from Mario Hernandez, and, if appropriate, overrule it).) However, the
State, like Mario Hernandez, does not discuss the actual statutory language of the
section authorizing the enhancement when use of the weapon is also an element of the
underlying offense. (See generally Resp. Br.) Rather, because the statute discusses
use of “a firearm or other deadly weapon” elsewhere in the statute, the State would
effectively have this Court read the “or other deadly weapon” language into the portion
of the statute relevant to Mr. Passons’ case.

(See Resp. Br., pp.7-8 (“if a person

commits aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon, he is eligible for the sentence
enhancement.”).)
Again, the State’s argument runs contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent,
which holds that, where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the courts are
to “simply follow[] the law as written.” Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr, 151
Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal quotation omitted). “If the statute as written is socially or
otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial.”

Id. (internal

quotation omitted.) Therefore, the State’s argument, which essentially asks this Court
to rewrite the relevant portion of the statute, should be rejected as well.
Since the sentencing enhancement does not, by the plain language of the
relevant statute, apply to Mr. Passons’ case, and because the sentence exceeds the
term of sentence otherwise authorized in his case, Mr. Passons’ sentence is illegal and
violates the protections against double jeopardy. That illegality clear from a review of
the basic record of his sentence and the language of the applicable statutes. Therefore,
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it should be corrected under I.C.R. 35(a). As such, the district court erred in denying
Mr. Passons’ motion to that effect.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Passons respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his
motion to correct his illegal sentence and remand this case for imposition of a lawful
sentence.
DATED this 8th day of February, 2017.

___________/s/______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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